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BOOK REVIEWS
STATECRAFT, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND
FOREIGN POLICYMAKING
The El Chacmizal Dispute
ALAN C. LAMBORN and STEPHEN P. MUMME
Boulder: Westview Press.
$32.50 s.c.

Why did it take more than half a century for the United States to
comply with the decision of an international arbitration tribunal? Why
did it take so long to settle the Chamizal boundary conflict?
The dispute arose when between 1852-1873 the Rio Grande shifted its
course to the south in the El Paso area. The most radical shift occurred
in 1864 when, under flood conditions, the river violently left its banks,
cutting into Mexican territory to establish a new course for its flow and
in the process leaving behind several hundred acres of land which had
been formerly south of the river in Mexico. The shifting river continued
to change course and had moved approximately 600 acres to the U.S.
side of the river by 1873. This land had been clearly Mexican, but was
it still? This question was raised because under the U.S.-Mexican Boundary Treaty of 1884 the boundary between the two countries was the middle
of the river. However, if the river changed its route slowly, the boundary
moved with it, but if the river changed its course "avulsively," the
boundary did not change. Thus, was the course change of 1864 avulsive
or not? Did Mexico lose 600 acres of national territory or not? The
question was made even more complicated because the incidents occurred
before the 1884 treaty was signed.
To answer these questions the two countries submitted the matter to
international arbitration, and in 1911 the international arbitration tribunal
under the chairmanship of the Canadian jurist, Eugene LeFluer, decided
that the 1884 treaty did apply retroactively, and that the river had in fact
moved avulsively and therefore the land in question remained Mexican.
The U.S. rejected the finding and refused to honor it on the basis that
the tribunal had exceeded its authority.
The matter became a cause celebre throughout Latin America, and a
festering "burr under the saddle" of U.S.-Mexican relations. The Mexican
diplomat, Vicente SAnchez Gavito, summed up the Mexican dismay,
"Mexico never wins in its disputes with the United States for when
considerations are decided against Mexico, Mexico accepts; but when
they are decided against the United States, the United States does not
accept." He added, "Mexicans are a sporting people, and when a decision
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is made against them they are inclined to accept it regardless of the
technicalities and they expect other people to take a similar attitude."
On the other hand, some Mexican politicians preferred that the issue
not be settled since it gave them a "sure fire" campaign issue.
It is not the case, however, that numerous negotiations were not undertaken to settle the issue, because they were. There were the Hoover,
Truman, and Eisenhower Rounds before the issue was finally resolved
under President Kennedy's leadership, fifty-two years after the decision
of the tribunal was rendered.
The question is raised why did it take so long, and why was Kennedy
successful and the previous efforts not? Was it just a question of a forceful
and charismatic President succeeding where the others had failed? The
authors conclude that the answer is much more complex than that. The
resolution of the Chamizal dispute required the coalescence of overriding
international issues, and managing domestic constituencies. The authors
observe that the American diplomats had to "settle the Texas problem as
much as the Mexican problem."
The Chamizal dispute is particularly revealing in documenting the
tension between the top levels of the State Department and a "local"
quasi-autonomous agency, between global goals and local interests, between the national foreign policy apparatus and local political power.
In the Truman Round, President Truman and the Secretary of State
wanted to achieve better relations with Latin America which considered
"the Chamizal case as one in which the U.S. reneged on an international
arbitral award which went against it" (p. 90). But local Texas interests
did not want to give an inch of "Texas" soil to Mexico.
President Truman and the top echelon of the State Department were
sorely handicapped on at least two major scores. President Truman needed
to be elected in 1948 and settling the Chamizal would do "nothing to
increase his political chances in the election" (p. 88), and if he were not
elected, he was not "going to be able to make policy of any kind" (p.
88). Senator Connally of Texas, also Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, made this absolutely clear to the President, and
the President needed the electoral votes of Texas.
Secondly, the agency upon which the State Department had to rely to
negotiate the settlement, the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), was quasi-independent and was adamantly opposed to the
settlement as proposed by the State Department. It was a case of the
negotiator being the fox in the hen house.
The IBWC was constituted as a quasi-independent agency by the 1944
Rio Grande and Colorado River Treaty with authority to design and build
large international projects in the style of an "international corps of
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engineers," and it was empowered to settle disputes involving the international boundary and waters of the two countries.
To fund these large projects, the IBWC needed the support of the Texas
congressional delegation, and the IBWC Commissioner, Lawrence Lawson, effectively built a coalition with key Texas congressmen and senators.
He represented local interests well, and the strong allies in Congress
supported IBWC interests and projects in Washington. One congressman,
Representative Rooney from Brooklyn, was even fond of calling the
IBWC the Texas Boundary and Water Commission.
Out of this institutional environment, the U.S. government presented
a being in conflict with itself; it suffered from institutional schizophrenia.
The President and his top foreign policy advisors wanted to pursue global
goals to improve U.S. relations throughout Latin America, the IBWC
and its Texas allies wanted to protect local Texas interests.
Since the IBWC was in the position of being the lead negotiating agency
by virtue of its treaty mandate and its knowledge of the technical engineering issues, it was in the strategic position of being able to frustrate
the negotiations and the foreign policy makers of the United States including the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Walter Thurston, Thomas Mann,
Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs, and the President
himself. The "Texas problem" certainly was at least as difficult as the
Mexican problem.
It was a classic example of the border states playing a blocking role
as Dr. Helen Ingram has so well documented elsewhere (State Role in
U.S.-Mexico Resource Issues, TR Report, Vol. 1, #1, Spring 1987 and
State Government Officials' Role in U.S./Mexico TransboundaryResource
Issues, 28 Natural Resources Journal, 1988).
Yes, Kennedy did come along and he was personally dedicated to
settling the issue, but he was able to do it only with the convergence of
a number of other developments. First, the issue was important in the
context of Kennedy's efforts to improve relations with Latin America and
his Alliance for Progress. Texas opposition was severely weakened because they no longer had the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations
under their control as they had had with Senator Connally during the
Truman Round. Lyndon Johnson was now Vice President and thereby
neutralized since "it was hardly in his interest to prevent Kennedy from
achieving a publicly announced diplomatic initiative."
In addition, the head of the American Section of the IBWC had changed,
weakening the long standing opposition of the IBWC. Commissioner
Lawson retired. The new commissioner, Leland Hewitt, did not have the
same established political network, and suggested a strategic change. He
suggested that the State Department play the lead role in negotiations.
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This placed the IBWC in a subordinate, supportive, technical role. Hewitt
in turn retired due to ill health and Joseph Freidkin was appointed by
President Kennedy. The combination of these events freed the State Department and the President to follow the agenda of broader international
policy objectives with fewer constraints from local domestic interests.
Resolution did require a strong President with a personal interest in the
problem, but it also required a congruence of changes in domestic coalitions so as to manage the "Texas problem."
The authors make a major contribution in putting the Chamizal dispute
in context, and in analyzing not only the interplay between the two
countries at the diplomatic level, but also the interplay between the State
Department and the IBWC, the IBWC and local interests, and the State
Department and those state and local constituencies.
This insight illustrates the complexity of resolving rising issues of the
1990s. In the case of the All-American Canal, the powerful congressional
delegation of California will be a major force to contend with for the
IBWC and the State Department. In regard to a U.S.-Mexico groundwater
treaty, the substantial influence of Texas and its established water users
will make it difficult for the State Department and IBWC to move ahead
with negotiations. The physical location of the U.S. Section of the IBWC
in Texas makes that influence even more direct. As the pressures for
resolving groundwater issues grow, it may become necessary for the State
Department to lead the negotiations as was the case in the Chamizal in
order to deal with the "Texas problem" and the "Mexican problem."
This book is must reading not only to understand the Chamizal dispute,
but also the complex relationships between the President, the State Department, the IBWC, and the political power centers of the border states.
This analysis of the tortuous, twisting negotiations gives the reader a
deeper appreciation of how difficult it is to reach agreement; difficult
enough at the international diplomatic level, but made infinitely more
difficult by the byzantine road blocks thrown up at the state, local, and
agency levels which in turn are affected by the chemistry of individual
personalities. It is enough to make one wonder how agreement is ever
reached, because the interests of the numerous players are so varied and
often diametrically in conflict.
This book, using archival materials only recently available, makes an
important 'contribution to understanding U.S.-Mexico relations, in general, and, of course, the Chamizal, in particular. It is helpful also to read
an earlier Mexican account in La FronteraNorte de Mexico: Historia,
conflictos 1762-1975 (published in Spanish by Editorial Porrfia, S.A., in
Mexico City) by Ambassador Cdsar Septilveda.
ALBERT E. UTTON
Editor-in-Chief

